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Enterprises are turning to Internet technology to 
circulate information, interact with potential customers 
and establish an e-commerce business presence. These 
activities are depending highly on Web server and 
maintaining good server security has been a 
requirement for avoiding any malicious attacks 
especially web defacements and malware. Web server 
administrators should be alert and attentive to the 
status of the server at all time. They need to be 
persistent in monitoring the server in order to detect 
any attempted attacks. This is an advantage for a web 
server that is maintained by a big company that has a 
big budget to hire a knowledgeable web server 
administrator, for a new established small company it 
will only burden their expenses. To overcome this 
problem, this paper proposes a low cost system called 
Autonomous Web Server Administrator (AWSA) that is 
fully developed using open source software. AWSA 
combines several computing concepts such as Virtual 
Machine, Intrusion Detection System and Checksum. 
AWSA offers a Virtual Machine based Web server that 
has the ability to automatically detect intrusions and 
reconstruct corrupted data or the file system without 
any human intervention. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Today, the current explosion in Internet trading may have 
eventually contributed to cast doubt on the trustworthiness 
of the services. Trust is at the heart of each and every 
transaction of online businesses. To establish the trust, the 
company not only needs to persistently declare the 
infrastructure is secure but also needs to have the tools to 
let the customers establish trust by themselves.  
As online business sites become attractive targets for the 
customers, Phishing scams, identity fraud and website 
spoofing have become some of the most lucrative business 
models of today’s cyber-criminals. According to Malaysian 
Computer Emergency Response Team (MyCERT) the total 
number of DDOS and intrusion incidents report are 
increasing from 60 reports in September 2000 to 1661 
reports in September 2010 [1]. Nowadays, anyone can 
attack Internet sites using readily available intrusion tools 
and exploit scripts that capitalise on widely known 
vulnerabilities.  
Despite stiff challenges from attackers, the influenced of 
World Wide Web to broaden market potential across 
geographical boundaries has led major companies or even 
Small Medium Enterprises (SMEs) to seriously expand 
their operations and marketing strategies over the Internet. 
However, a major concern of these companies is to put 
aside a huge investment on the security system in order to 
build trustworthiness among customers and to protect its 
image.  
For that reason this paper presents a novel framework of 
Autonoumous Web Server Administrator (AWSA), a 
Virtual Machine (VM) based WWW Server, to enhance the 
trustworthiness of online businesses. It proposes the 
combination of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and 
file system integrity to detect and prevent attacks against 
services running on a VM and maintaining the services 
after the attacks. In summary, AWSA offers the following 
advantages: (1) the ultimate solution for SMEs to get 
involved in online business. All AWSA components utilize 
open source applications which are relatively low cost, 
scriptable and modifiable, (2) to maintain the services 
running on a VM from outside (host system), thus keeping 
the IDS safe, out of reach from intruders, (3) to detect any 
malicious data modification that the intruders have made 
through file system integrity checking, and (4) maximizing 
the state of the VM which can be saved, cloned, encrypted, 
moved or restored. It allows AWSA to re-construct the 
corrupted disks or files on the VM by transferring 
duplicated data from the host system. 
 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
describes the Virtual Machine (VM) concept. Section 3 
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presents the architecture of a self-protected AWSA. Section 
4 explains the details of our implementation of AWSA and 
discusses the prototype performance. Section 5 concludes 
the paper with a brief summary.  
 
II. VIRTUAL MACHINE 
 
A. Virtual machine environment 
 
A Virtual machine (VM) is defined as an efficient and 
isolated duplicate of a real machine [2]. This environment is 
created by using a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM) which 
provides a second layer on a machine for another operating 
system to run on. VMM reproduces everything from the 
CPU instructions to the I/O devices in software of the 
operating system it runs on. Virtualization in a VM involves 
mapping of virtual resources, for example, the registers and 
memory, to real hardware resources. It also uses the host 
machines instructions to carry out the actions specified by 
the VMM. This is done by emulating the host Instruction 
Set Architecture (ISA).  
The underlying operating system is called the host 
operating system [3]. VMM runs on top of the host 
operating system. Hence it can hold a second or more 
operating system on it. The operating system which runs on 
VMM is called the guest operating system. Fig. 1 illustrates 
the virtualization concept of VM. The host operating 
system and the guest operating system can be either the 
same or different type of operating system. For instance, 
Windows can run as the host operating system and Linux as 
the guest operating system.  
VM and virtualization research have been going on for 
nearly thirty years; IBM VM/370 was among the first 
VMM applications introduced. VMWare[4], Virtualbox[5], 
and Xen[6] are some examples of more recent VMMs that 
have been developed. Another close environment which 
also provides virtualization is called an emulator. The 
difference is that the emulator only let one guest operating 
system to run on the host system. An example of an 
emulator is Qemu [7], which is used in AWSA 
development. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Virtual machine environment. 
 
B. Advantages of virtual machine 
 
VM technology is widely used to run operating systems 
or software developed specifically for one platform on 
another platform. For AWSA, this can be manipulated to 
increase a server security, others are exploited as below: 
Compatibility: VMM can run any operating system on 
top of it without any modification being.  
Isolation: VMM provides a complete layer of virtual 
hardware to the guest operating system, the guest operating 
system communicates directly with the hardware without 
going through the host operating system, thus providing a 
strong isolation between the host and guest operating 
system.  This indeed will protect the host operating system 
and any host application from being manipulated by an 
intrusion on guest operating system. 
Security: VMM is written in a few lines [7], which make 
it a simple program. Due to its small code size, VMM 
provides a better trusted computing base than the guest 
operating system itself. This narrow interface restricts 
intruder actions from invading the host operating system. 
Inspection: VMM can have access to any operations in 
the virtual machine; CPU instructions, all memory actions, 
I/O device and I/O controllers operations. This feature will 
let the host operating system to view any operations taking 
place in the guest operating system via VMM and provide a 
mechanism for monitoring intruder activities.  
 
C. Related Work 
 
The main objective of this paper is to propose a system that 
can sustain intruder invasion on a server and fix any 
corrupted data in the server without any intervention from 
an administrator. Similar work has been done in ReVirt[8] 
and Terra[9]. These two researches manipulate VM as a 
monitoring mechanism for any intrusion that might occur 
on the system this is done by modifying some of the code in 
VM. Hence make it different to the work done in this paper. 
AWSA only take the advantage of Isolation features in VM 
without making any changes to the code. 
 AWSA have a similar concept to Livewire [10], where 
IDS is used to monitor VM from it host operating system. 
Using this method IDS is place outside the VM which will 
protect the IDS itself by making it out of reach from 
intruders attack. The difference that AWSA has over these 
two is the next actions that take place after the intrusion 
occur. In their work, IDS is use to only monitor and 
reporting the incident in a log file or database and the next 
action will have to depend on the administrator’s 
responsibility for the server, in contrast attack analysis and 
necessary recovery action take is done automatically in 
AWSA. 
 VM provides isolation between the host operating 
system and guest operating system. Due to its small and 
narrow code of VMM and also the power of VMM to 
monitor the process of guest operating system, VM gives an 
advantage for AWSA and it component (IDS and 
checksum) to be invisible from the intruder attack. On the 
other hand, the monitoring and report generated by IDS will 
alert AWSA to take further action on the intrusion made to 
the server where cheksum will act as the integrity checker if 
any of the data is corrupted.  
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 In general AWSA have the ability of isolating potential 
target with it defense system, monitoring of intruder as well 
as reporting their activities, data integrity checker and 
finally reconstruction of compromised data. By considering 
all this as the features of AWSA, we can compare the 
difference and similarities of AWSA with the other related 
work. The comparison of AWSA with ReVirt, Terra and 
Livewire is summarized in table I. 
 
Table I 
The Difference and Similarities of AWSA with Other Related 
Works 
 
System 
Features A
W
SA
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t 
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er
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L
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e 
Monitoring and 
reporting ? ? ? ?
Isolation ? ? ? ?
Data integrity 
Checker ? ? ? ?
Data 
Reconstruction ? ? ? ?
  
In conclusion, AWSA is developed by improving the 
works that have been done by researchers and developers of 
the system mentioned in this chapter. In general AWSA is 
only putting the bit and pieces provided by each element 
mentioned above into a complete puzzle that reinforces the 
security of a server. 
 
III. AWSA ARCHITECTURE 
 
A. AWSA framework 
 
As online business becomes an attractive target to cyber-
criminals, self-protection against attacks is becoming an 
indispensable attribute of web servers. To achieve self-
protection, a web server has to monitor itself, analyze the 
information obtained, plan a defense against detected 
attacks, and execute the plan. Therefore, in this work, we 
adapt these characteristics to design the AWSA. It is a 
combination of 6 main components: (a)Isolation, 
(b)Network Monitoring, (c)Logger (d)Analyzer (e)Integrity 
Checker and (f)Data reconstruction, as shown in Fig 2.   
The purpose of isolation in AWSA is to keep the rest of 
the protection mechanism away from the web server, 
making them invisible to the attacker’s eyes. Thus, it 
protects the other functions from being manipulated by the 
attackers. To facilitate this component, a VM is used to 
encapsulate the web server away from the host operating 
system. Meanwhile, network monitoring is used to view the 
incoming data packets that go into the web server. It also 
acts as a triggering mechanism to warn the other 
components to start taking action if it detects suspicious 
data packet going through the network traffic. Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) [10] [11] is chosen to equip AWSA 
as network monitoring tool. 
 
 
 
           Fig. 2: The system architecture 
 
Logger is the next process executed in AWSA to respond 
to the alert issued by the previous function. Logger is a 
database that keeps important information such as date and 
time of the attack, IP address of the attacker, alert priority 
generated by the activities, and classification of attack that 
are captured from the suspicious data packets. The gathered 
information is used by the analyzer to determine if the data 
packet is used for intrusion or not, if it is found to be a data 
packet from an attacker then it will be blocked. 
The analyzer also has the ability to compare the original 
value of the checksum with the generated value from data 
the integrity function. The integrity checker is able to 
perform checksum once an intrusion is detected by the 
analyzer. AWSA’s next function is to perform a data 
reconstruction if the comparison of data integrity by the 
analyzer found that the data stored is compromised. 
 
B. AWSA daemon 
  
Our main focus in this work is to develop the analyzer or 
simply called AWSA daemon. It is considered as the heart 
of AWSA and controls the flow of the system. The 
processes done by AWSA daemon is depicted in Fig 3. 
Upon receiving a triggering signal from IDS, AWSA 
daemon updates the alert into the database. The alert 
generated by IDS is based on the risk level caused by an 
attack. Each risk has it own priority. Table I shows the risk.  
Once the database updated, AWSA daemon analyzes the 
data to look for a potential attack, this is done by counting 
the attack that is originated from similar attackers and 
similar risk level. The result obtained is then compared with 
a predetermined threshold value. The threshold is used as 
an indicator to catch any suspicious attacker with 
reasonable doubt and at the same time, minimizing the false 
alarms, which can burden any security system, especially 
the log file. 
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Table I 
Prioritization of the IDS alert 
Priority Attack Risk Level 
Priority 1 High 
Priority 2 Medium 
Priority 3 Low 
 
Once the comparison value is over the threshold, the 
suspicious attacker alert is erased from the attacker’s log 
and the attacker’s IP address is temporarily blocked from 
accessing the services offered by the web server. This will 
prevent a continuous attack from the same potential 
intruder. It also prevents the attacker log file from getting 
bigger as well as to reduce the log processing time.  
The next process is the execution of the data integrity 
checker by checksum. Checksumming in the server helps to 
detect whether important files have been tampered with. 
Any changes made by any malicious programs installed 
illegally or unauthorized modification to the file without the 
knowledge of file system is checked by checksum soon 
after the detection of suspicious attack by the AWSA 
daemon. The checksum process is executed only on the 
files system of the guest operating system as well as the 
important data files used by the Web server and not on all 
the files. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: Flowchart for AWSA daemon 
 
The checksum result is then compared with the original 
checksum value stored in the AWSA daemon log. If 
differences are detected, it shows that the files have been 
tampered with and the next process is activated. When there 
is a difference between the compared values, AWSA starts 
implementing its reconstruction mechanism. This is the 
advantage of utilizing AWSA; it provides automatic 
recovery of the corrupted files. Therefore, the file system 
on the VM can operate without any interruption to the web 
services and intervention from the web server administrator.  
Finally, after certain duration of time, the blocked IP 
address is removed from the list, and the user can access the 
web services again. However, if they attempt to attack the 
web server again, AWSA is ready to repeat all these 
processes.  
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULT 
 
A prototype was implemented on a Linux platform, using 
QEMU for virtualization. Linux Fedora core 3 and 
Slackware Linux were deployed as host and guest operating 
system respectively. The entire server was being monitored 
by SNORT 2.0.2 [12], a public-domain IDS tool. Swatch 
[13], the active log file monitoring tool was used to alert the 
AWSA. The verification of the data integrity was done by 
utilizing MD5 checksum. The hardware used in the 
experiments was a standard PC system (AMD Athlon XP 
1600 CPU, 256 MBytes RAM).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4: Integrity checking time 
 
The performance of AWSA is measured by two aspect; 
the durability in facing continuous web attacks and the 
response times taken to (a) detect and block attacker’s IP 
address, (b) verify the integrity of data, and (c) reconstruct 
the compromised data. The durability tests were done by 
exposing the server to several web attack tools, namely 
Adore [14][15], Brutus AET2[16], Nmap, Smurf2k and 
Angry IP scanner. Each of the attacks is successfully 
detected by AWSA and the attackers IP address was 
blocked. 
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Fig. 5: File recovery time 
 
On average, it took 86 sec for AWSA to impose the 
access restriction. This Average Blocking Time is taken 
starting from the time AWSA daemon detects the numbers 
of attacker’s attempts exceed the predetermined threshold 
until the AWSA daemon alienates the attacker. Fig. 4 
illustrates that AWSA daemon took less than 30 seconds to 
perform the integrity test on 1 Gigabyte of data and the file 
system of the server. The obtained result shows the time 
taken by AWSA to perform a checksum on several files 
with various sizes. It is a good indicator for estimating the 
period of performing a checksum on the particular files 
sizes.  The final evaluation of AWSA is the file recovery 
time which indicates the time taken by AWSA to 
reconstruct the compromised data to its original state. Fig. 
5, clearly depicts that files with larger sizes would consume 
more time in transferring the contents to the guest operating 
system. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper proposes the idea of Autonomous Web Server 
Administrator (AWSA), a VM-based Web Server that 
provides an autonomous attack detection and data recovery 
system. AWSA is a script-controlled daemon and mainly 
consists of Intrusion Detection System (IDS) and file 
integrity checking. The IDS is used to detect any malicious 
attacks from the intruders. IDS is kept isolated from the 
Web Server, therefore, it is inaccessible to VM processes 
and cannot be subverted by intruders; offers high attack 
resistance to IDS itself; and provides great visibility to the 
monitored system. File system integrity checking is 
deployed by AWSA to detect any attacker’s signatures left 
in any files if they successfully break-in into the system. 
Once the corrupted data is identified, the AWSA 
automatically recovers any damaged files by transferring 
the original contents stored in the host system. 
In the near future this work will be extended in finding a 
better IDS architecture available to be incorporated with 
AWSA and to extend a research on providing the integrity 
checker for the virtual machine itself. This research work is 
also towards finding a process of providing a forensic 
mechanism in order to investigate how an attack is occurs 
so that countermeasures can be taken for future attack. 
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